Clausewitz's on War (Books That Changed the World) Review

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Clausewitz's on War (Books That Changed the World) ReviewProfessor Hew Strachan's Clausewitz's On War is a worthy companion to the "Books that changed the world" series. His biography of Clausewitz and his magnum opus describe well the complexity and evolution that existed/developed in both author and work through the Napoleonic wars and up to Clausewitz's death in 1831.
Professor Strachan is of course the author of the current standard work on the First World War and his obvious effort to comb through and digest a work like On War is impressive.
Clausewitz attempted to accomplish two very ambitious goals in On War, the first was to write an art of war for his own epoch, and the second was to construct a general theory of war which would be able to cover all wars. This lends a certain duality to the work and promotes analysis from at least two distinct perspectives. The problem is of course that some parts are more heavily influenced by the Napoleonic art of war theme and others by the general theory of war theme. Parts of the Napoleonic art of war theme are still applicable today, but one must of course take Clausewitz as a man of his times who was writing to an audience of that time, not to us today. In normal historical works it is up to the reader to judge what is still relevant, but with Clausewitz this becomes even more difficult since the general theory comes also into play and has to be judged on its own merit. .
Strachan has attempted to do justice to both themes and in addition take on the necessary topics of the difficulty of translation from the original early 19th Century German and the book's unfinished condition. Overall I think the historian's view predominates which is to be expected. My only point in this regard is that if a great theorist (instead of a great historian) had written this book it would have been different, not necessarily better, but different.
Several points that really stand out for me:
First, the concept of "absolute war" can be seen as a Weberian ideal type, or as something "complete in itself" that "belonged in the real world" (page 148). This second concept sees war as a separate entity, that is no longer subordinate to politics but reacting to its own laws, possessing its own "Geist". That is capable of becoming in effect autonomous, like the Thirty Years War, a social phenomena propelled by ever increasing levels of hatred fuelled by seemingly limitless and lawless violence, The total destruction of a resisting society/community.
Second, the influence of Clausewitz on the course of the First World War has been hotly debated since the 1920s. Strachan argues that Clausewitz was saying that should the initial campaign fail, a war of attrition is called for, but I can't help but see this more in terms of war's reciprocity, that is Clausewitz arguing the defense, attrition being a means in which the defence gains time, preserves itself and attains its "negative purpose" by various ways. One must also remember that Clausewitz writes that, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather than the tactical decision, should be considered the operative principle." (Book 6, ch 8). For the mature Clausewitz, the theorist, the political purpose would dictate whether the war should continue after the culmination point had been reached. For Clausewitz, the patriot of 1807 war was more the means of retaining his country's lost honor and independence. Strachen notes that it was this Clausewitz who inspired the Nazis, but his political writings and Book 6, Ch 26 (The People in Arms) would also inspire any national liberation movement fighting a foreign occupation.
Strachan concludes his chapter "The Nature of War" with, "Those who blamed Clausewitz for the slaughter of the First World War were not guilty of finding things in the text of On War that were not there", which of course leaves the actual question of influence open. That question in my mind concerns more how Clausewitz was posthumously interpreted by Moltke; Schlieffen, Goltz, and others.
Third, Strachan describes Clausewitz's concept of theory well, "The role of theory was to elucidate events, and so reason alone was insufficient. Detailed military history s required to evaluate an understanding of the true nature of war . . . Theory has to be concrete and circumstantial, not dogmatic and prescriptive. (page 41).
Finally, Strachan makes very important points concerning the relationships between "tactics" and "strategy" and "politics/policy" and "war". By avoiding the intermediate concept of "operations" as existing between tactics and strategy, a conscious decision of Clausewitz's according the Strachan, he was able to avoid "an obstacle to conceptual clarity" (page 110). Also in regards to the two ways that the German Politik can be translated into English, Strachan points out that in On War Clausewitz deals with policy as representing all the interests of the political community (Bk 8 Ch 6B), but also in his analysis of the campaigns of 1814 and 1815, saw French party politics as having a negative influence on Napoleon's decisions (pp 164-5). In other words in strategic theory terms war's subordination to politics can be either rational and "subjective" as in policy, or irrational (in terms of military force being an instrument) and "objective" as in politics. This is important to keep in mind when considering Clausewitz's continued relevance, since we can see the collapse of the publically proclaimed policy goals in the current Iraq war as being replaced by domestic US political considerations and interests (party politics and their associated investors).
Some points that Strachan makes I find stimulating in that they invite discussion. For instance he criticises Clausewitz on his handling of logistics, arguing that Clausewitz believed "that war had been liberated from logistics . . . Book 5 treated the 1812 campaign in Russia, a country too backward to sustain a large army by requisitioning, as exceptional, whereas in Book 6, on defence, took the same campaign as characteristic. This was a contradiction which he never reconciled . . . Clausewitz's determination to set strategy free from its logistical constraints was reflected in German planning in 1914 and in 1941, with terrible consequences" (page 122).
Napoleon had been able to use requisition to supply his armies, which is Clausewitz's point, that being that this ideal type of warfare had achieved this, but this was not something that could be assumed in the future, since it had not always been that way in the past. Strachan mentions 1914, but not 1940 where the German Army was able to cover even greater distances in the West and defeat the allies whereas logistics had been one of the reasons for the lack of German success in the West in 1914. As to Russia being an "exception" in terms of logistics, there is a reason for this, as Clausewitz writes, "It is rare after all, for an army of 300,000 men to advance for 650 miles on practically a single road, to do it in countries such as Poland and Russia, and just before the harvest" (book 5, ch 14). In fact such a feat doesn't come up again until 1941 (Russian-gauge rail lines having replaced single roads), if one discounts the German advance into revolutionary Russia in 1918. Strachan's "contradiction" doesn't seem like a contradiction at all, but rather a switch in emphasis, for logistics Russia is an exception since "Russia is not a country that can be formally conquered . . . Only internal weakness, only the workings of disunity can bring a country like that kind to ruin." (Book 8, ch 9). So instead of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Lenin in a sealed train in 1917 would be the Clausewitzian method of dealing with Russia as an enemy. It is this very strong defensive status that Russia enjoys that allows for such analytical diversity and leads various elements/means/methods of defense characterised by the campaign of 1812 to be "characteristic". Also Clausewitz repeatedly mentions that it was Napoleon's failure to prevent the wastetage of his army on the advance (that would include logistics) that led mostly to his failure in Russia (Bk 3, Ch 12, Bk 5 Ch 14). Linking Clausewitz to 1941 is dubious in my view given what should have been seen as a flashing red light in regards to defeating Russia in a single campaign through exclusively military means.
Something I did find a bit of a disappointment was Strachan's handling of Clasusewitz's concept of the balance of power (pp 164-5 and in On War, Bk 6 Ch 6). He provides no analysis of the situation in August 1914 from this perspective, and what better historian to do so than Hew Strachan?
One point needs to be kept in mind throughout, when reading Hew Strachan's great biography, or Michael Howard's Clausewitz - A Very Short Introduction (which I also recommend) or On War. As Herbert Rosinski wrote in the 1930s:
"Clausewitz grasped the idea of war as a coherent, continuous whole, directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance. This brilliant inspiration transformed his investigation from the naive brilliance of his earlier studies into the philosophical profundity of his mature work. Yet this very conception of the "military act" as a continuous, coherent whole - the truth of which he found confirmed by the concrete example of Napoleonic strategy, but which he did not deduce from it - was to lead him into a perplexity that later military thought completely ignored and that forced him in the last resort to emancipate his theory from the "Napoleonic " model altogether...Read more›Clausewitz's on War (Books That Changed the World) Overview

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